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'I. what )isarmamem .,. 
tind? how much? 
SINCE 1946, the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and other powers have been engaged 
in various types of negotiations aimed at disarmament and the lessening 
of the threat of war. These talks have been singularly unsuccessful, 
except those leading to the Antarctica Treaty and perhaps to the still- 
pending nuclear test ban. The latest series of disarmament negotiations, 
in the ten-power committee meeting in Geneva from March to June 
1960, broke off abruptly, and the first session of the 15th U.N. General 
Assembly was not able to devise new machinery to continue these 
negotiations. 
The reasons for the lack of progress in disarmament are multiple, 
partly due to the suspicion ofURussia that the US. wants "cdntrol and 
no disarmament" and to the suspicion of the U.S. that Russia wants 
"disarmament and no control." In addition, there have been deep 
divisions on disarmament within U.S. govemment departments and 
these have confused and weakened America's posture in these negotia- 
tions. Partly this vacillation has been due to the lack of a comprehensive 
effort in the govemment even to coordinate political and military studies 
for disarmament. 
Comprehensive and controlled disarmament 
Comprehensive disarmament would lessen the possibility of catastrophic 
war. Today there is no national security and no world security. The 
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possibility of general nuclear war breaking out is high. No government 
--certainly neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R.-can defend its people 
from utter devastation in case of war. Present defense strategy cannot, 
in the final analysis, prevent annihilation; it can only guarantee mutual , 
annihilation. If the goal of comprehensive disarmament were agreed 
upon by the great powers and all nations, and if successive stages of 
a disannarnent plan were put into effect progressively, the dangers of 
nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, or design would lessen as the 
stockpiles of nuclear and conventional weapons and their carriers were 
reduced. Limited wars might arise during one stage or another of a 
disarmament agreement, but the danger that they might escalate into 
a nuclear war would be progressively diminished. 
Comprehensive disarmament would make funds available for 
peaceful projects. The $320 million dollars spent daily in all countries 
for armament could gradually be turned to productive uses. These funds 
could be used for reduction of taxes and public debt, for grave public 
needs, and to speed industrialization of the underdeveloped countries. 
While the initial cost of disarmament inspection systems might be large, 
the savings from comprehensive disarmament would ultimately be 
tremendous. 
Comprehensive disarmament would lessen world tensions. Because 
the arms race itself has become a major source of tensions, agreement 
upon the goal of comprehensive disarmament by the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R. and significant steps toward this goal would make easier the 
solution of outstanding political conflicts. 
Comprehensive disarmament would heighten the opportunity for 
non-military competition. In a world becoming disarmed, there would 
still be severe political, economic, and ideological competition. Such 
competition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (or between the U.S.S.R. 
and China) would be for the allegiance of the non-aligned world and 
would be waged in a manner which would be of greater benefit to the 
underdeveloped nations. The weapons of the ideological struggle would 
be non-military, and thus human survival would no longer be in jeopardy. 
This competition would take the form of which nation can do the most 
for underdeveloped areas. Thlis is the battle we should welcome and 
could expect to win. 
Arms control 
Arms control, a term coming into increasing use, is unfortunately 
capable of several definitions, with important differences. A number of 
experts use the term, "arms control," to describe initial stages in a 
long-range program which they hope may eventually lead to controlled 
disarmament. Others use the term interchangeably with disarmament. 
However, some students of the arms problem hope for the achievement 
of disarmament and believe the best that can be expected is an arms 
limitation scheme or partial disarmament which leaves in being at the 
end of the process substantial national military forces capable of waging 
war. This approach is neither a substitute for controlled disarmament 
nor a practical goal. In general, "arms control" as used herein will 
refer to arms limitation schemes and not comprehensive and controlled 
disarmament. 
Stabilized deterrent 
The central arms control doctrine in the U.S. today is that of deterrence. 
This is an old military concept. In essence, it is a threat to carry out 
punitive measures in the event of a specific hostile action. In the nuclear 
era this has become stabilized nuclear deterrence: a surprise nuclear 
attack from one nation cannot prevent nuclear retaliation by the other 
nation. Thus in theory the initial attack is deterred. Each side would 
refrain from attack for fear of being destroyed. 
If the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. each had 200-500 hidden or mobile 
nuclear missiles, for example, this concept would "guarantee" that if 
either country were destroyed by a surprise missile attack, there would 
remain sufficient and automatic missile retaliation to destroy the other 
nation. This would be accomplished by a second strike force of hidden 
missile bases, roving Polaris submarines, and missile launchers mounted 
on moving railway flatcars. Since the enemy nation could not locate 
and knock out most of these retaliatory weapons, it would be deterred 
from striking first. 
Some advocates of arms control foresee a period of several years 
during which a "stable" number of missiles on both sides would become 
the final arbiter in international relations. Such a nuclear deterrence may 
not, in this modem world, remain stabilized for long, and in any case, 
it may not deter war. 
A stabilized deterrent will encourage additional (Nth) powers to 
develop their own independent nuclear force. France is openly trying 
to acquire such a deterrent and it is reported that China is likewise doing 
so. It was recently estimated that a dozen or more nations could develop 
their own weapons in about six years. The greater the number of 
nuclear nations, the greater the possibility of nuclear war. A multiplicity 
in the possible origin of a nuclear attack and the means of delivery 
would compound confusion for the nation which is automatically 
geared to retaliate against only one enemy. The spread of nuclear 
weapons will dilute the deterrent, and eventually nullify it. This process 
is already occurring. 
A stabilized deterrent will not eliminate war by accident. Although 
the tendency to panic may be reduced by making the retaliatory system 
more "secure," the possibility of human or mechanical error remains. 
This danger will be compounded by the spread of nuclear weapons to 
more and more nations. An accidental explosion during a period of 
extreme tension, a malfunction of a warning system, an aggressive act 
by a single officer or weapons crew, a sneak attack by a smaller nation- 
all could trigger a chain of events leading to general nuclear war. 
A stabilized deterrent will not stop the arms race. International 
tensions and fears would continue to remain high without the prospect 
of disarmament. Governments would feel compelled to develop new 
military technology and stockpile new weapons, causing instability in 
the deterrent system; therefore, one side or the other may become 
convinced that it is necessary to launch a preventive or preemptive war. 
A stabilized deterrent will not lessen, and may increase, the possi- 
bility of limited war. Nuclear stockpiles would not be eliminated and 
bbtactical" weapons would be available for use. Since, under a stable 
deterrent, "massive retaliation" cannot be successfully threatened, 
"brush-fire" military adventures may be encouraged. There is ominous 
further danger that a limited war can always grow into a general war. 
A stabilized deterrent could be self-defeating. The probabilities of 
nuclear war resulting from "bluff calling" or nuclear blackmail are 
high. A country can be trapped by its own threats; if its bluff were called 
and it did not_ act, it would never again be listened to-it could never 
again deter. If a nation carried out its threat, war would ensue. There 
are grave dangers of wrongly estimating the opposing nation's moves 
or intentions. Each side, equipped with an arsenal of strategies for 
outwitting the other, can readily impute to the enemy the very modes . 
of thought that it itself has developed. The "self-fulfilling prophecy" 
can produce war. 
A stabilized deterrent will not stabilize ideological initiatives. 
Schemes for balancing military forces can be outflanked by political 
and economic strategies. The. strains thus produced can provoke military 
response and upset the deterrence. Thus a stabilized deterrent could 
become a new Maginot Line. Reliance on a stabilized deterrent in 
preference to joining issue in the ideological battle on the political 
and economic plane represents a tacit repudiation of confidence in the 
ability of a free society to compete successfully with communism. In 
any case, deterrence cannot prevent political revolutions. 
A stabilized deterrent will be politically unacceptable to the world. 
The sincerity and the peaceful intentions of the U.S. would be seriously 
questioned if it should propose stabilized deterrent measures. Since 
the U.N. unanimously voted for "general and complete disarmament" 
in the autumn of 1959, the continued advocacy of a stabilized deterrent 
by the U.S. would be regarded as a step backward and as an effort to 
stall forward motion on what most nations believe to be essential and 
inevitable. Such a policy would be seen for what it is: a holding opera- 
tion based upon irrational suspicion, essentially a strategy of moral 
bankruptcy and defeatism. The totally cynical interpretation of the . 
intentions and needs of other nations which are implied in this policy 
are not justified by a close study of the current political context. 
Comprehensive disarmament 
Disarmament, to be effective, must proceed by sequential monitored 
stages down to the level of arms required to maintain order within 
nations. Systems for arms limitation are -cult to inspect, and easily 
reversible. They would do little to allay fear and tension. The chances 
of an arms limitation system enduring for any length of time are slight. 
Also, the capability to construct weapons of mass destruction cannot 
be unlearned, and other new weapons could not be "uninvented." 
Further, a U.N. Peace Force could not maintain a preponderance of 
power except in a disarmed world. 
I;, ;,k. :=' - - .  
U.S. proposals through June 1960 do not specifically make com- 
prehensive disarmament their goal. However, on October 27, 1960, 
Ambassador James Wadsworth stated before the U.N.: "We wish and 
intend, under honest, balanced, and inspected agreements, to travel 
the road of genuine disarmament all the way to the end." The U.S. has 
made some generous offers regarding first step measures it regards as 
negotiable immediately. These include cessation of production of fis- 
sionable materials, control and reduction of stockpiles, and monitoring 
of missile firings. 
The Russians have resisted any fist steps outside the framework 
of a comprehensive treaty on disarmament to which the major powers 
are committed. They interpret such measures as providing "inspection 
without disarmament." There are indications that the U.S.S.R. is pre- 
pared to accept phased control provided there is mutual agreement on 
the goal. Chairman Khrushchev so indicated on several occasions in 
the autumn of 1960. (For example, Prof. Louis Sohn attending the 
Pugwash meetings of scientists in Moscow early in December, 1960, 
observed that the Russians "seem willing to accept substantial controls 
in a first stage if that stage includes a substantial amount of disarma- 
ment.") The U.S. should carefully explore the sincerity of these state- 
ments. There is no way of knowing how much control the Russians 
will accept short of entering negotiations on a detailed, step-by-step 
disarmament treaty. 
In preparation for such negotiations, the U.S. needs to define clearly 
what it envisages as the end goal for disarmament, how balanced and 
equitable reductions can be implemented, and what technical measures 
will be necessary in order to make control of each stage feasible: 
control being defined as adequate inspection measures to deter evasion. 
Because there will be national antagonisms and problems of justice 
in a disarming world, attention and study must be given to developing 
strengthened Qr new international institutions to keep the peace and 
continue international efforts for justice. The organs of the U.N.- 
legislative, judicial and punitive-must be strengthened before disarma- 
ment can be'carried to completion. The U.N. Disarmament Commis- 
sion and the U.N. Secretariat itself could initiate new studies. 
Heretofore U.S. studies in disarmament have been few, understaffed, 
underfinanced, and uncoordinated. A new Peace Agency should be 
established to conduct research into the technical and economic steps 
toward disarmament, prepare proposals for negotiation, and coordinate 
the views of various government agencies involved in planning for dis- 
armament. It should be supplied with funds commensurate with the 
importance of its tasks. One of the key roles of a Peace Agency should 
be to plan the kind of machinery needed to settle disputes and keep 
the peace in a disarmed world. 
Recommendat ions 
1. The Kennedy Administration should establish new machinery 
to coordinate all official efforts to plan disarmament agreements. 
2. The U.S. should adopt as its unambiguous goal comprehensive 
disarmament (universal, complete, total) down to small arms 
needed to maintain domestic order, provided there is phased 
inspection and creation of new international institutions to 
maintain peace and justice. 
3. The West should launch a world-wide public education cam- 
paign on disarmament so that the chances for success of inter- 
national negotiations on disarmament will be increased. 
4. Concerned American organizations and individuals should co- 
ordinate efforts to launch a public education campaign on dis- 
armament within the U.S. so that any government negotiations 
will be supported by widespread public opinion. 
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Here Is W h  
1. Write a letter to President Kemedy in your own words urging 
- 
that the U.S. work vigorously for comprehensive and fontrolled 
disarmament. 
The White Nouse 
Washington, D. C. 
If you have time to write two additional letters with the same 
rnesqe, send them to the following: 
kre tary  Dean Rusk Mr. John J. Md=loy, Adviser, 
hgmrtment of State Disarmament Administration 
Washington 25, D. C. 
2. Write lettern to both your senators (Seaate e e  Building, Wash- 
ington 25, D. C.) and to your conpmaa  (House CMice Building, 
Washington 25, D. C.) urging them to support the Flicies given in 
this booklet. Enclose a copy of this primer. 
3. Visit key leaders in your community (businessmen, educators, labor 
oflcicials, etc.), talk to them about this issue and give each a copy 
You Can Do 
5. Discuss this bus  with your minister, priest, or rabbi and urne him 
to deliver a sennon on the topic. 
6. Urge appropriate education and action projects on this iasw cul- 
minating b the adopttion of a resoution in the clubs, civic associa- 
tions, political parties, unions, veterans groups, and church or 
synagogue to which you belong. 
7. Order quantities of this primer (and companion primers on "A 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Now" and "The Economics of Dik 
armwmmt") for distribution. There is a special quantity price of 
12 primus (all similar or four of each) for $1.00 postpaid. 
To Keep Informed/SANE-USA 
To work effectively for world peace today, concerned citizens must 
be fortified with facts and figures. World peace has become a compli- 
cated study, but in our democracy the people must make the decisions 
and not abdicate responsibility to any small group of policy-makers. 
To keep informed about the dynamic complexities in the fields of 
nuclear weapons tests, disarmament, and the economics of disarmament, 
read the monthly publication, Sane-USA. You will keep up to date with 
special monthly columns about developments in Washington and at 
the United Nations. 
An annual subscription (for 12 issues) of Sane-USA costs $2.00. 
A two-year subscription is $3.75, with SO# extra per year for foreign 
postage. 
In Place of Folly 
Norman Cousins has written a handbook for the concerned citizen 
on nuclear war and what must be done if man is to survive. You will 
know why Mr. Cousins is considered one of the most prophetic voices 
on the world scene when you read among the eighteen chapters of 
In Place Of Folly those entitled: Primer of Nuclear War, CBR and 
Man, The Fallacy of the Deterrent, What About Russia, Don't Resign 
from the Human Race, and Checklist of Enemies. 
In Place of Folly has been widely reviewed and praised. Published 
in January, 1961, it is available in the cloth bound Harper Brothers 
edition for $3.00, or in the special SANE paperback edition for $1.50. 
SPECIAL SUBSCRIPTION OFFER 
Two-year subscription to SANE-USA.. ..... .$3.75 
One copy of the special SANE 
Special offer ............... $4.49 
NATIONAL SANE 
17 East 45th Street 
New York 17, N. Y. 
Please send the special d e r ,  for which $4.49 is enclosed. ($1 additional if 
foreign postage.) 
.................................................. ..................................................... NAME.. .STREET.. 
(please print) 
............................................... CITY. ZONE. ....... STATE. ....................................... 
Make check or money order payable to National SANE. 

